They will then go all shocked pikachu face then the government assault team in their door step taking them way... how can this bee they were the good ones.. they were on the "right side of history"...

Welcome to the system, everyone's a victim Doesn't matter if you're red or blue it hates you all

On the other hand I understand what the post you're replying to is saying, even if it's not said extremely well. There is an enormous online narrative with a lot of money and power behind it trying to normalize the most violent and anti-democratic parts of the right wing of American politics and using that to drive views, clicks, and votes.

I'm normally not someone to clutch pearls and will be the first one to acknowledge that the vast majority of Americans are just decent enough people trying to figure out how to keep fed, healthy, and safe. But the tendency toward fascism in the human animal is something we need vigilance against, as demonstrated over and over again in human history.

The people who attempted to violently attack the seat of democratically elected power in this country were not protestors. There were protestors outside, but the people who crossed the line to breaking and entering, assault, and terrorism were not protestors.

it didn't start at gps data from google... it went from public posts on facebook to the email and phone number account associated with that to the google account associated with that to the gps data associated with the google account. if you show me them using a reach around route to get that gps data and persecute peaceful protestors that haven't been suspected of criminal activity then i do agree it's troubling. if you want me to agree that the government is not within their rights seek evidence via normal, judge approved, subpoenas to investigate/prosecute people storming the capital and doing legitimate crimes then i disagree. you need probable cause and that bar should be fairly high.

> investigators obtained GPS and other cell phone records from Google via a search warrant

Search warrants are and remain the correct tool for the government to get this data. What this article is worrying about is the fact that sometimes the government simply purchases this data without any sign off from a judge. That's where constitutional protections are eroded.

Your outrage is misplaced until such time when the government can buy this data from Google without a search warrant.

I figure either he was shown some very strong and classified evidence that the data the NSA had been collecting was critical to protecting the people even while it violated their constitutional rights and freedoms or else he was shown how much dirt they have on him and his family and he was blackmailed into publicly declaring his love for NSA spying and handing them more tools to collect data while making only a few token changes.

If you have the wherewithal to protect yourself from the unsavory underworld types who will inevitably come after you for revealing things they'd just as soon keep secret.

There's a reason you only see the government doing this kind of thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bellingcat

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/54680228-we-are-bellingcat

That's spot on, and your analogy is a good one, except that in the realm of personal information, no warrant is required in the US.

There is quite a bit of law and numerous court decisions around this process in the US.

That jurisprudence is more generally called the Third-Party Doctrine[0]:

   The third-party doctrine is a United States legal doctrine that holds that 
   people who voluntarily give information to third parties—such as banks, phone 
   companies, internet service providers (ISPs), and e-mail servers—have "no 
   reasonable expectation of privacy" in that information. A lack of privacy 
   protection allows the United States government to obtain information from 
   third parties without a legal warrant and without otherwise complying with 
   the Fourth Amendment prohibition against search and seizure without probable 
   cause and a judicial search warrant.[1]

Edit: To clarify, I disagree with this doctrine and would love to see limitations on data retention periods as well as warrant requirements for access to such data.

True, but it's even worse than that. Many of those who do understand it, simply don't care ("nothing to hide", "nothing to fear", etc.).

The allure of a "free" service that everyone else uses is enough to abandon any expectation of privacy, and consciously come up with arguments that it doesn't matter.

Going further, it must be clarified that the whole point of doing things this way is that people do not understand it. The people who want to surveil everyone could either do it illegally and get in trouble, or create an inscrutable bureaucratic system that so sufficiently obscures what they are doing that they get the same results along with a legal cover if they are discovered. If we did have privacy laws that prevented this, they would just collect it illegally. This is absolutely not to say that privacy laws are pointless (they would be helpful) but that we must understand this situation not as an accident, but as the slow creation of a class of people who want to exercise power over us and have been getting their way.

Having data on everyone and then only using it against people they want to use it against is exactly what the Stasi did. Obviously this is their dream come true --just a little to late for them.

Let me tell you what companies can do: they can make lists and pass it privately around to deny you gainful employment, loans, investment, etc. They can also sell it to the government, subverting privacy and due process rights.

But in all seriousness, you should know it is actually possible to use data towards good aims. Policy makers can use data to produce better answers to questions exploring issues like poverty, disease, crime, financial literacy, etc. Setting up a massive survey is slow and extremely expensive, and that makes it extremely hard to iterate on findings. Getting answers years quicker makes it possible for the government to develop better policies, and that's a good thing. Sure the Nazis were evil, and information enabled the Nazis to be more efficient and effective at implementing evil policies. But an un/less-informed government isn't a goal to strive for. Good government implementing good policies is a goal worth striving for, as there are some problems that can only be addressed at government scale.

[0] https://www.census.gov/

Absent this, one of three conditions exist:

1. There is no monopoly. In which case violence is widespread, and there is no state.

2. There is no legitimacy. In which case violence is capricious.

3. Some non-state power or agent assumes the monopoly on legitimate violence. In which case it becomes, by definition The State.

The state's claim is to legitimacy. A capricious exercise would be an abrogation of legitimacy

Weber, Max (1978). Roth, Guenther; Wittich, Claus (eds.). Economy and Society. Berkeley: U. California Press. p. 54.

<https://archive.org/details/economysociety00webe/page/54/mode/1up?view=theater>

There's an excellent explanation of the common misunderstanding in this episode of the Talking Politics podcast: <https://play.acast.com/s/history-of-ideas/weberonleadership>

The misleading and abbreviated form that's frequently found online seems to have originated with Rothbard in the 1960s, and was further popularised by Nozick in the 1970s. It's now falsely accepted as a truth when in fact it is a gross misrepresentation and obscures the core principles Weber advanced.

In your comment, what you confuse is capacity for violence (inherent in all actors, state, individual, corporate, or non-governmental institutional, with numerous extant examples of each) with the Weberian definition of a monopoly on the legitimate claim to violence. In practice, enacting violence on virtually any actor will engender some counterveiling response, though the effectiveness will vary greatly depending on the comparative power and/or disinhibition of the entity responding.

There are numerous examples of private corporations or non-governmental actors engaging in violence, with or without state support or sanction. There are the 100 million souls lost, respectively, to the British East India Company's occupation and administration (as a private entity, with military powers) of India, of the transatlantic slave trade by numerous private commercial operators, and of the genocide against the indigenous populations of the Americas, again much by privately-chartered corporations (as the original British colonies were). There are extant mercenary forces such as Constellis (formerly Academi, formerly Xe, formerly Blackwater) in the US, or the Wagner Group presently transacting genocide in Ukraine. There are oil companies who have initiated coups, paramilitary actions, and assassinations throughout the world. There is the Pinkerton Agency, still extant, and with a storied role in violence against labour and civil rights movements. There are railroads, with their own (private) police forces, which are in fact registered as law enforcement despite being nongovernmental.

The truth is that there is no clean distinction between State and Private use of force, lethal or otherwise. What there is in government is, one hopes, legitimacy and accountability to the citizenry rather than to creditors and investors.

If we have no problem with privacy, it shouldn't be illegal to wear a mask in public.

Creating tradeable property rights is older than web3. (Web3's innovation was turbocharging securitization by skipping the step of finding something worth securitizing.) The question is whether, and to what extent, we want personal data to be a market good. It currently is.

For people who are targeted or in risk of being targeted by three letter agencies, it’s a different story.

It’s so easy for any three letter agency to install a mole or buy someone in those open-source projects like GrapheneOS, for example to publish compromised binaries. The best option is always to not use anything connected to the cell (GSM, 4G, 5G etc.) network and carry all comms encrypted over internet, with pre-exchanged secret keys and preferably over a network like I2P and over public Wi-Fis. You can use I2P outproxies to connect to visible (normal) internet. I do NOT recommend Tor, there were reports of Tor being compromised and it’s too suspiciously popular to be trustable IMHO. Pay attention to CCTV cameras as well, don’t sit in a mall to connect its public Wi-Fi. All these things obviously introduce a lot of friction to your communications, but if you are such a high-value person you should have set up your network of people accordingly beforehand as well, to relay messages and such. QubesOS is a good OS for such people. If you have the means, custom device solutions to communicate over radio with encryption is by far the best option you can have, especially for receiving critical comms on time. This only leaves the risk of triangulation when you transmit, but you must be a really high value target for this to happen. And you can always still use internet as I described to transmit.

Don’t ask how I know all this.

How hard can it be to combine one more database entry into a deanonymisation process?

I'm not disputing a data broker sells data; I'm claiming that ad-platforms don't.

In general, those companies aren't interested in bundling up data on users and selling it to third parties because the data itself is the nest egg. They go out of their way to, if anything, provide services for anonymous matching of interested parties to users they've collected data on, but not in a way that lets those parties pull the data back out.

Some journalist was like, "what happens if I go to [VHS Rental Store] and ask for the list of videos a supreme court nominee rented". And the store gave him the list and he subsequently published it and then congress panicked as they knew their rental history could be next.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_Privacy_Protection_Act

Continuing the story, lets say we have a company and I'll make up another name for them: Scroogle. Scroogle operates a popular website and collects your location whenever your phone connects to the website. Scroogle does not sell this data to the USG.

Which company is complicit in the widespread sale of data? Perizon has it's own data ingest system separate from Scroogles. It's always been separate and it's been operating for decades; Scroogle is not complicit in Perizon's decisions.

--

Now, there is certainly an arguement that Scroogle shouldn't collect all the data it does. But lets be calling a Spade a Spade here; Perizon is the company that fits your description.

Feeds into what "system".

Do you really think Google/Amazon/Apple/etc are handing over your Name+Phone number to say Spokeo [1]? I just don't think you get it. Your phone company is the one that is selling your data to anybody not FAANG.

It's easy to say some "ad-tech" are doing X, but actually get a whiteboard out and start with say Google and list what products of theirs collect what data. Then list the process by which say the USG buys its from Google. I'm very interested in what names for the processes are going to be because I really doubt you'll find any for the ad-platforms.

[1]: https://www.spokeo.com/people-search

True, but it was never this granular on this mass of a scale. I remember joking as a kid about the Nielson families that would kill a TV show because they went out to dinner instead of watching TV that night. The extrapolation that was applied to those kinds of numbers were always ripe for bad interpretation. The same thing can be said about polling numbers. The granularity is what makes modern day "ad tech" or tracking in general so damn dangerous in its accuracy

Is Snowden some kind of 4d chess false flag? lol ....

[1]: https://www.theverge.com/2013/10/30/5046958/nsa-secretly-taps-into-google-yahoo-networks-to-collect-information

As an example, Apple complied with 90% of government requests for user data: https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-complies-percent-us-government-requests-customer-data-2020-1

The parent comment said “every single person in adtech is complicit”.

Most employees do not possess that level of agency about what happens to their work.

But in practice, almost everyone with these databases with significant amount of data is working for an entity with shareholders and creditors. It's much harder to stay in control forever in that world, especially if your company is not perpetually successful. Companies decline or fold all the time. Then they get sold off.

The people being referred to in the above comment aren't people who have thought in any depth about the issue of privacy and the boundaries that should be put in place to prevent abuse of violation of individual privacy and come to a contrary opinion. It's about people who are so completely heads down in their tiny vision of work and life that they've never really thought about the issue and only see things like "individual right to privacy" as annoying roadblocks they have to deal with to do what they're paid to do.

The annoyance and frustration is with the apathy towards and issue, not with contradictory opinions.

People don't study history and so we're doomed to repeat it. The reason why the Nazi holocaust of jews was most effective in the Netherlands is because of how incredible that country's record keeping was. You could argue that the violation of privacy might not be terribly abused today, but the people in charge today won't be in charge forever.

1. Nature of Trust: I think depending on how much you trust your government that views on state surveillance are going to change and similarly how you trust corporations. We should definitely acknowledge this because it plays a major factor. I believe your stance is from that of trust for government but distrust of corporations. Personally I distrust both (American). The two slight advantages I see to surveillance capitalism are that the collected data is distributed and that it is easier to poison the well. In the competitive corporate setting they _tend_ to not sell the data but rather access to the tools to process the data. (To be clear, both forms exist) If the data could be bought then it gives their competition advantages. So there's a weird incentive to keep that data locked tight (think Google & Facebook as opposed to Equifax). The hope is that no single entity can collect enough information. As for poisoning the well, I'd assume that this would almost always be illegal for a state surveillance program but difficult to sue in a corporate setting. I believe that it is also easier to fine or punish a single actor in the state case -- especially since they need to set examples -- while a corporate case they will likely not pursue as this is expensive unless you create and distribute tools. But maybe that's a bad assumption.

2. Abuse potential: This is the argument that I think privacy maximizers focus on and do not budge or even recognize the usefulness of surveillance (you got to understand if you want to prevent it). Personally I see democracies as perpetual balancing acts and naturally unstable. But that the benefits outweigh the costs. The issue, often called 'Turnkey Tyranny", is that a single bad actor can be democratically elected and then abuse that power (we've heard this, I'll move on in a sec). We don't have to point to Hitler, but we can even point to the abuse that the parent discussed with respect to the Patriot Act which we saw used and arguably abused under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. Surveillance creep seems more pervasive within a government system, to me, as what I've seen is that once something is in place it is hard to remove. On the other hand, in a corporate setting you can move a lot faster. For example, Apple and WhatsApp/Facebook are both on privacy kicks, promoting their encryption. We all know that there's still collection, but the positioning themselves as privacy preserving has kicked off a competition in the other direction while we haven't seen such a movement in the US government (personally I wouldn't say GDPR is strong and that the EU articles are easily circumvented). That's a clear double edged sword but does feel like it can respond to user sentiment faster (one of the big differences in capitalism vs communism is market response and I see corollaries here). On the other hand I've continuously seen my government try to remove encryption and even attempt to hid it under the guise of universally hated things (child porn and terrorism). Essentially I see laws/regulations as more sticky than corporate decisions. Combine that with the above hope for distribution, I think there is less potential for abuse. The final factor we need to include is that a state can do more harm to a citizen than a corporate entity can.

For your specific cases about a bike being stolen or the common one about the feeling of safety walking down the street, especially at night, I think there are other correlating factors that we can't ignore. While we see examples of bikes being returned and bad guys quickly caught I'm not convinced these are statistically higher or primarily dependent on the surveillance itself. Perception obviously plays a role: perception of risk to commit crime as well as perception of likelihood of victimization. One of the most interesting statistics I see (I probably spend an unhealthy amount of time thinking about these numbers lol) is that Americans perceive crime as increasing year over year while there is a dramatic trend downwards[0,1,2,3]. Though I'll be honest in that [0] notes that less than half of crimes are reporter of solved, but the lowest rates are with sexual violence and we have been seeing a steady increase in reporting (likely related to MeToo and other such movements). But I also am having trouble finding estimates of under-reporting for other countries so this might be related to my original comment about America's failures being more in the open or possibly bad googling. I can at least state that from personal experience I have little fear in leaving my door unlocked and often friends comment at how crazy and careless I am but despite having lived in areas with perceived high crime rates (I look them up) I have yet to have had anything taken from my household. I will say that bike theft is common in my area, but the homeless rate is high and that's an easy to pawn item and probably a better indicator of a different problem (a confounding variable) than actual safety (which I'm mostly thinking is violent crime).

Sorry for the wall. I hope I didn't repeat too much that is argued to oblivion.

[0] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/11/20/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/

[1] https://news.gallup.com/poll/1603/crime.aspx

[2] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/31/violent-crime-is-a-key-midterm-voting-issue-but-what-does-the-data-say/

[3] https://news.gallup.com/poll/404048/record-high-perceive-local-crime-increased.aspx